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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In this paper, the author analyzes and develops the dialectical problem of criticism. 
Is the act of criticizing (being critical or skeptical, or challenging or attacking) the 
proponent’s viewpoint free of any dialectical bounds or conditions? The role of 
criticism lies in between two dialectical risks: shifting the burden of initiative and 
ambiguity. On the one hand, criticizing a specific position presupposes an implicit 
reason not to accept to be committed to it, which can be made explicit and defended. 
For this reason, the proponent can ask or require the opponent to provide 
clarifications and reasons in support of the critical stance, and thus risking shifting 
the burden of initiative. On the other hand, such a request is often reasonable, 
especially when the criticism or the request made by the opponent for further 
reasons is potentially ambiguous or extremely vague, or when it is directed against a 
proposition that is commonly shared. How to find a balance between these two 
dialectical risks? The answer that is suggested lies in the concept of burden of 
criticism, and the conditions governing it. 
 
2. CRITICISMS AND THEIR DIALECTICAL NATURE 
 
The first step needed for specifying the burden of criticism is to analyze the speech 
act of criticising a viewpoint. The author singles out a fourfold description based on 
the focus, the norm, the level and the force of a criticism. The first dimension 
consists in the subject matter, namely in what is criticized (the standpoint, the 
reason, the specific major premise of the scheme used). The second dimension is the 
norm that is appealed to in order to advance the criticism (the rule for critical 
discussion, the rules governing the quality of an argument, the institutional rules). 
The third dimension is the level, namely whether the criticism is dialogical (against 
the standpoint or its reasons) or meta-dialogical (an attack against the admissibility 
of the proponent’s dialogical moves). Last, the force of a criticism corresponds to the 
type of speech act used to elicit the proponent’s reply. The critical reaction can be a 
directive or an assertive. This account raises two crucial issues: the strategic 
dimension of the force of a criticism and the classification of, or rather interrelations 
between, these dimensions.  
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 The first distinction that can be made is between two types of acts of 
criticism: 1) advancing an assertive act, consisting in a negative judgment on the 
other’s position (argument); and 2) performing a directive act of requesting 
grounds. In both cases, we can notice, we have the same effects on the 
conversational (or rather dialogical) context, but at a different level. In (1) the 
illocutionary act commits the opponent to a value judgment, and at a perlocutionary 
level invites (leads) the proponent to defend his position. In (2) the opponent is 
committed to a request, and suggests a negative consequence of a failure to reply 
satisfactorily. Depending on whether the negative judgment is explicit or implicit (or 
rather, indirect) the opponent exposes himself directly or indirectly to fulfilling a 
burden of criticism. While in the first case the negative judgment can open to the 
proponent the possibility of exploiting the burden of criticism at his advantage, in 
the second case the only possible move is requesting for clarifications or attacking 
the move itself if it challenges presumptions.  
 The second issue is to classify these characteristics, and see how they can be 
interrelated. The first crucial distinction is between the types of acts of criticism: 
while directive moves request further ground for supporting a standpoint, 
assertives provide backing for both challenging a viewpoint and grounding a meta-
dialogical attack, consisting in ruling out the proponent’s move. Among the 
dialectical moves, the opponent may opt for playing within a dialogue rule imposing 
a burden of criticism on a critic to a standpoint, or appeal to the criteria for 
assessing arguments. In this latter case, he can consider the argument in itself or as 
a move. In the first case, he can criticize a premise or request further grounds, while 
in the second case he points out the unacceptability of a move based on its fallacious 
nature. Finally, the opponent can strike a meta-dialogical attack by appealing to the 
institutional rules of the dialogue, excluding a specific move of the proponent as not 
complying with the conditions of the dialogue. We can represent a tentative 
classification of the moves of criticism in the following figure (Fig. 1):  
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Standpoint
Major premise 
of the argument
Argumentation 
scheme
Rules for critical 
discussion
Rules for quality 
of arguments
Institutional 
norms
Dialectical Meta-dialectical
Argument in its content Argument as a move
Assertive Directive
 
Fig. 1: Classification of criticisms 
 
3. THE BURDEN OF CRITICISM AND THE EPISTEMIC LEVEL 
 
As mentioned above, criticism involves the risk of ambiguity and offers the 
possibility of reversing the burden of initiative. The proponent, instead of defending 
or providing reasons in support of his viewpoint, may request the opponent to 
prove the grounds of his critical stance. How to draw the line between a reasonable 
request of grounds or specification and a potentially mischievous one? The paper 
points out an important distinction based on the epistemic nature of the 
commitments that have been criticized. The author distinguishes between two types 
of criticisms: against potentially controversial propositions and against presumptive 
commitments. In the first case, the opponent may offer counter-considerations, 
namely reasons advanced to meet a certain burden of criticism. In the second case, 
he shall provide such counter-consideration, as his criticism is challenging a 
proposition that is presumed to be accepted by everybody in a given community, or 
at least everyone in the conversational context. We can analyze the dialectical 
effects of presumptive commitments from two points of view: their reasoning 
structure and their pragmatic nature.  
 Presumptions are characterized by three features: a reason, the dialectical 
burden-shifting effect, and their nature of reasoning in lack of evidence (Ullmann-
Margalit, 1983, p. 147). First, presumptions are propositions that are generally or 
contextually accepted for a general or specific reason. For instance, they can 
represent propositions commonly considered to be acceptable (if an expert 
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expresses an opinion on an issue in his domain of knowledge, the opinion shall be 
considered to be acceptable / reliable). Or they can derive from a specific dialogical 
reason. For instance, if the opponent asks the proponent to ground his viewpoint on 
an expert’s opinion, he is presumed to accept the relation between expertise and 
reliability as acceptable and reliable. The second characteristic is that presumptive 
reasoning does not provide proofs, but only a reason to shift the burden of proof 
onto the other party. Since they are commonly accepted proposition, the 
interlocutor needs to provide evidence to prove that the conclusion drawn from it is 
not the case. The last feature is their use in conditions of lack of evidence. 
Presumptions operate when proof is not available (Louisell, 1977, p. 290); they are 
not a form of evidence (Rescher, 1977, p. 1). In a dialectical system, the participants 
cannot state and demand commitment to all the possible propositions. Some of 
them are presumed to be part of the other party’s commitment store even if there is 
no evidence that they actually are. This latter characteristic leads us to the analysis 
of the second dimension of presumptive commitments, their pragmatic nature.  
 Presumptive commitments can be compared to what Walton and Krabbe 
(1995; see also Corblin, 2003) called dark-side commitments, or also implicit 
commitments. Implicit commitments are not inserted in the participants’ 
commitment stores based on explicit acts and a dialectical process of evaluation and 
acceptance. Rather, they are taken for granted to be part of what the interlocutors 
have accepted. In this sense, they are presupposed to be actual commitments in two 
different senses (Ducrot, 1966; 1968). They can passively presupposed in the sense 
that they are presumed to be part of the interlocutor’s commitment store based on 
reasons (because they are known to be accepted by the community; because the 
interlocutor expressed this commitment in the past…). They can be actively 
presupposed in the sense that the speaker treats such propositions as commitments 
when there are no reasons, or when it is unreasonable to do so (Macagno, 2012). 
For instance, the speaker can presuppose a redefinition of a concept that he knows 
to be unacceptable or unknown to the hearer. In both cases, the opponent (the 
hearer) needs to provide reasons to retract the commitment, both when it is a 
genuine one and when it has been unduly presupposed. Otherwise, he can attack the 
move by terminating or suspending the dialogue and opening a meta-dialogue. 
However, also in this case he needs to provide reasons supporting his criticism.  
 On this perspective, presumptive commitments can be considered to be 
presumptive by the opponent not because of their epistemic nature (which is a 
justification of their dialectical status) but rather because of their pragmatic 
dimension (they are taken for granted and therefore presumed to be part of the 
other party’s commitment store). In this sense, presumptive commitments place the 
burden of criticism onto the opponent because they are pragmatic instruments for 
shifting the burden of proof.  
 The dialectical force of presumptive commitments is strictly connected with 
the notion of kairos, i.e. opportunity (Bitzer, 1968). Kairos is basically related to the 
specific opportunity at a given time (Kinneavy, 2002, p. 67): the speaker chooses a 
premise that is to be accepted by the interlocutor in case contrary arguments are 
not advanced. The speaker chooses premises that are generally accepted, or simply 
presumably acceptable, belonging to the domain of likeliness or eikòs. This latter 
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term refers to what “is accustomed generally to take place, or which depends upon 
the opinion of men, or which contains some resemblance to these properties, 
whether it be false or true.” (Ciceronis De Inventione I, 46). Enthymemes are 
grounded on what is presumed to usually occur, on what is likely to be true for a 
specific audience, and not on statistical probability (Viano, 1955, pp. 280-86). The 
choice of a premise that is only likely becomes a choice of a dialectical strategy 
aimed at shifting a specific type of dialogical burden of initiative. 
 
4. DIALECTICAL STRATEGIES OF AMBIGUITY 
 
In the last part of the paper the author analyzes different dialectical profiles, namely 
sequences of moves that describe a specific dialogical interaction. On this 
perspective, a dialogical move opens up certain possibilities and rules others out. 
This idea is applied to the requests for argumentation and requests of explanation. 
The opponent can advance different types of critical reactions, i.e., he can choose 
between different ways of asking the proponent to provide further grounds to 
support his viewpoint. His critical reaction can be extremely general (why A?) or 
more specific, indicating the class of schemes to be used to support the position or 
the specific argumentation scheme (or premises of it) that the proponent needs to 
focus on in his reply (scheme bound challenge).  
 The crucial point that this analysis suggests is a possibility of designing 
distinct strategies bound to the specificity of the critical reaction. For instance, a 
generic request for argumentation is highly vague, in the sense that it can be 
interpreted and met in different ways. For this reason, the opponent is unlikely to 
incur a burden of criticism, but at the same time he leaves to the proponent the 
widest possibility of reply (request explanations or clarifications; advance an 
argument based on different grounds). On the contrary, a specific request restricts 
the possible options of the proponent, but it crucially depends on the 
reasonableness and possibility of backing it up. A challenge bound to an argument 
from expert opinion (is there any expert vouching for it?) can be advanced when no 
argument from expertise has been used by the proponent, otherwise the opponent 
needs to meet the burden of showing that the authority was not a good one, or a real 
authority. We can represent this chess game of criticisms and possible replies in 
figure 2 below: 
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Fig. 2: Moves and possible reactions – challenging a viewpoint 
 
This figure represents only the first move, i.e. the possible moves opened by the 
opponent’s criticism. The same representation can be applied to the further move 
consisting in challenging the argument from expert opinion. In this case the 
opponent has two possibilities: attacking the dialogical premises of the move (is 
Expert E a good one?), or challenging its dialogical presuppositions (why “if an 
expert says A, then A?”). In the first case, the proponent needs to fulfil the burden of 
backing up the controversial grounds of his argument. In the second case, however, 
the opponent attacks a presumption, or rather a dialogical presupposition, of the 
dialogue, which is a premise that is taken for granted and considered as accepted by 
everybody. In other words, the opponent rejects a commitment that has been 
already inserted in his own commitment store by the very fact of having engaged in 
the dialogue. He is no longer aiming at continuing the dialogue, but rather modifying 
some of its conditions (the presumptive commitment structure). For this reason, the 
burden of initiative is on him, as he needs to provide reasons supporting the reason 
why a certain dialogue presupposition cannot be considered as such. We can 
represent the structure of this move in figure 3 below:  
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shifting 
 
  
Fig. 3: Moves and possible reactions – challenging an argument 
 
On this perspective, the presumptive nature of some commitments makes their 
retraction, or rather challenge, a move at a different dialogical level. The burden, in 
this case stemming from a critique, is on the party who makes such a move. He 
needs to rebut one of the presumptions on which the dialogue is grounded, just like 
definitions of common word or institutional or dialectical rules. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
Van Laar’s paper raised several extremely interesting issues. This commentary is 
intended to show how some of these advances can be translated into a 
structuralistic perspective, combining the insights of formal dialectics with the 
categories of argumentative structuralism. In particular, this commentary aimed at 
underscoring the importance of the idea of pointing out the relationship between a 
criticism and the consequent moves and burdens that it (in a structuralistic 
perspective) “implies”, or rather means, considering its dialectical effect. On this 
view, the meaning of a move corresponds to the possible continuation of the 
dialogue. For this reason, the purpose of a specific criticism consists in the paradigm 
of possible replies that are offered to the interlocutor. This approach needs to take 
into account a linguistic, dialogical and epistemic difference between what is said 
and what is taken for granted. While the first category represents the commitments 
that the parties take on, or may take on, as a result of a move, the second dimension 
refers to what the parties consider to be the grounds on which they advance their 
moves. The implicit, or more precisely, presumptive commitments are the 
foundations of the dialogue, the boundaries and the conditions of the possible 
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moves that can be made. Obviously such presumptive commitments can be different 
in kind and force. Some of them are the very roots of an interaction (obligation to 
reply, compliance with institutional roles…). Others are the grounds of the 
reasoning that the interlocutors express in their acts of discourse. In both cases, 
challenging such premises is an act different in kind from criticizing a viewpoint. 
The burden of initiative shifts, and the dialogue structure is interrupted by a 
metadialogue with different rules and burdens. 
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